COMBAT UNITS
7TH INFANTRY DIVISION (LIGHT)
The 7th Infantry Div (L) operated throughout
Panama during Operation JUST CAUSE. Units were deployed early and had
rotated through the Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC) as part of
Operation NIMROD DANCER. A battalion task force, the 3d Brigade
Headquarters, and a major portion of the Aviation Brigade were in Panama
during the days prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Upon notification, the
2d Brigade deployed shortly after H-Hour and began operations in the western
portion of Panama, while the 1st Brigade deployed on D + 2 and moved into
Panama City to conduct stability operations. Units operated throughout the
entire country of Panama until redeployment from mid-January to early
February.
1st Brigade, 7th Infantry
Division (Light)
The 1st Brigade, 7th Infantry Div (L),
initially deployed to Panama on 12 May 89 as the Army element of Operation
NIMROD DANCER. The Brigade HQ, 1-9 Infantry, 2-9 Infantry, 2-8 FA Battalion
(-), and the forward area support team (-) rapidly moved to, and occupied,
Ft. Sherman. Based upon an analysis of PLAN BLUE SPOON, the Brigade began a
series of source projections which permanently placed infantry forces in
close proximity of the PDF Naval Infantry at Coco Solo, the 8th Infantry
company at Ft. Espanar, and the Colon Bottleneck. Detailed plans were
prepared and rehearsed as part of "Sand Flea" exercises. The 1st Brigade
conducted a relief in place with 3d Brigade and returned to Ft. Ord, CA, on
16 Oct 90.
On 20 Dec, the Brigade was alerted and
deployed. The Brigade was attached to the 82d Airborne Div and given the
mission to clear and secure the majority of Panama City. Elements of 3-9
Infantry closed into Howard AFB on 22 Dec and less than 12 hours later were
engaged in the city by squad-sized elements and snipers. 1-9 and 2-9 quickly
followed and, by 24 Dec, the Brigade was establishing control of an area
encompassing 600,000 residents. Over the next week, the Brigade had 21
separate engagements with elements of the PDF and DIGBATs while clearing and
securing the area of operations (AO). Additionally, the Brigade was
responsible for the security and isolation of the American, Cuban, Libyan,
and Nicaraguan Embassies as well as the new Panama government's headquarters
and office buildings. On 6 Jan 90, the Brigade relieved the 82nd Airborne
Div of security of the Papal Nunciatura. On 10 Jan the Brigade reverted back
to 7th Infantry Div (L) control and expanded its AO in Panama City to
control that portion held by the departing 82d Airborne Div. Subsequently,
the Brigade then transferred its AO to 2d Brigade and combined U.S.
MP/Fuerza Publica de Panama (FPP) control and redeployed to Ft. Ord on 17
Jan.
2d Brigade, 7th Infantry
Division (Light)
The 2d Brigade, 7th Infantry Div (L),
departed for Panama early on 20 Dec. They arrived at Torrijos Airport at H +
11 and immediately assisted in securing the airfield. After D + 1, the
brigade was given an AO ranging west from the Panama Canal to the Costa
Rican border. Primary objectives for the 2d Brigade included neutralizing
the PDF, securing key sites and facilities, protecting U.S. lives and
property, restoring law and order, and demonstrating support for the
emerging Panamanian government.
The brigade began operations by air
assaulting the 5-21st Infantry into the town of Coclecito on 22 Dec, while
the 2-27th Infantry and the 3-27th Infantry relieved the 2-75th and 3-75th
Ranger Regiment in Rio Hato. The 2d Brigade staged out of Rio Hato to
continue a two-phased operation in the west. The first phase had Bravo
company, 3-27th Infantry, air assault into Las Tablas and secure the area.
It captured 200 prisoners. During the second phase, the 2d Brigade moved to
the town of David in the western part of Panama to conduct stability
operations until relieved by the 2d and 3d Battalions 7th Special Forces
(SF). On 8 Jan, after being relieved in the west, 2d Brigade moved east to
join 1st Brigade in Panama City and relieve the 82d Airborne Div. On 13 Jan,
2d Brigade assumed total responsibility for the city. During this phase,
2-27th Infantry (-) returned to David by order of JTFSO to demonstrate the
ability to swiftly re-enter any area and show U.S. support of the new
government.
The 2d Brigade expanded operations to the
east toward the Colombian border, from 24 Jan to 6 Feb 90. Primary
objectives were to show a strong U.S. presence, support for the new
Panamanian government, and neutralize any remaining PDF elements. Operations
continued in eastern Panama generally without incident until 6 Feb when the
brigade redeployed to Ft. Ord.
3d Brigade, 7th
Infantry Division (Light) (TASK FORCE ATLANTIC)
On 15 Oct 89, 3d Brigade, 7th Infantry Div
(L), as part of Operation NIMROD SUSTAIN, assumed responsibility for all
U.S. forces in the vicinity of Colon from 1st Brigade, and became Task Force
(Task Force) Atlantic. The task force was involved in intense mission analysis,
planning, preparation and rehearsals. Every three weeks battalions would
rotate to JOTC, and become familiar with OPLAN 90-2. Units would conduct
"Sand Flea" exercises primarily to exercise U.S. freedom of movement rights
under the Panama Canal Treaties and to rehearse contingency plans.
Freedom-of-movement convoys were conducted twice weekly from Ft. Sherman to
Ft. Clayton or from Howard Air Force Base and back.
Combat operations began at 20 0038 Dec with
attached MPs and 4-17th Infantry neutralizing the PDF 8th Infantry Company
at Ft. Espinar and the PDF Naval Infantry at Coco Solo. 3-504th PIR, 82d
Airborne Div, conducting periodic rotation training at JOTC, was attached to
3d Brigade and given the mission to secure Madden Dam, clear the Cerro Tigre
logistic site, clear and secure the town of Gamboa, and seize Renacer
Prison. Local security of the Gatun Locks and Ft. Sherman was provided by
the JOTC cadre. By 0600 20 Dec all objectives were secured.
Task Force Atlantic then shifted their emphasis to
the city of Colon. Because of the large numbers of prisoners surrendering at
the Colon Bottleneck, the Task Force delayed entering Colon until 22 Dec. On D + 3,
three rifle companies conducted an amphibious assault into the Duty Free
Zone and into the eastern part of the city while two rifle companies
advanced through sporadic sniper fire from the south, to seize Colon. The
PDF Military Zone (MZ) II HQ, Cristobal Department of Investigation (DENI)
station and the Cristobal Pier were quickly seized and secured. The Task
Force began
civil military operations (CMO) on 23 Dec to restore law and order in
support of the new civil government.
On 7 Jan 3-504th PIR redeployed to Ft. Bragg
and on 16 Jan 3-17th Infantry arrived to relieve 4-17th Inf. 3-17th Infantry
was attached to 193d Infantry Brigade (L) and on 3 Feb 3d Brigade
redeployed.
7th Aviation Brigade, 7th
Infantry Division (Light) (TASK FORCE AVIATION)
On 18 Dec, two days prior to hostilities, the
Aviation Brigade deployed the tactical command post (TAC) from Ft. Ord to
Panama. The TAC assumed command and control over Task Force Hawk, a unit organized
to support NIMROD DANCER. Task Force Aviation was then formed, comprised of 1-228
Aviation, elements of the 82d Aviation Brigade, and the 7th Infantry Div (L)
Aviation Brigade. Task Force Aviation was then reorganized into four subordinate
elements: Task Force Hawk, Task Force 1-228 and Team Wolf and later Task
Force Candor.
Combat operations began with simultaneous
battalion and company air assaults, flown by pilots with night vision
goggles (NVGs), in support of Task Force Bayonet to Ft. Amador and Task
Force Atlantic to
Renacer Prison, Gamboa, and Cerro Tigre. Attack helicopters engaged targets
at Rio Hato, La Commandancia, Ft. Cimmarron, Panama Viejo, and Torrijos
airport. After daylight, air assaults into Panama Viejo, Tinajitas, and Ft.
Cimmarron were conducted supporting Task Force Pacific. Upon completion of these
missions, all aviation assets were placed under JTFSO control.
Task Force Aviation conducted resupply, command and
control, reconnaissance missions, and support for the hostage rescue forces
at the Marriott Hotel. On D + 2 the AO expanded with the air assault of
5-21st Infantry into Coclecito (western area of operations). Reconnaissance
missions were also conducted in Colon.
On D + 5 the 7th Infantry Div (L) requested,
and was given, air assets to support 2d Brigade's operations in the west.
Task Force Condor was formed and consisted of UH-60s, AH-1s, and OH-58s.
Support for 2d Brigade continued for two weeks, and consisted primarily of
air assault and reconnaissance missions. As 2d Brigade 7th Infantry Div (L)
was relieved in the west by SF, Task Force Condor began a phased recovery from David
through Rio Hato to Ft. Kobbe. Task Force Aviation redeployed all augmentation
forces and reduced Task Force Hawk to Team Hawk.
82D AIRBORNE DIVISION (TASK
FORCE ATLANTIC)
The 82d Airborne Div deployed the Division
Ready Brigade (DRB) consisting of 1st Brigade (-) with the 4-325th AIR
replacing 3-504th PIR. 1st Brigade's mission was to conduct a parachute
assault on Torrijos airport, isolate and neutralize PDF forces at Panama
Viejo, Tinajitas and Ft. Cimmarron and deny PDF reinforcement of Panama City
from within AO. Upon completion of combat operations, the Brigade conducted
stability operations until redeployment from 10-12 Jan.
1st Battalion, 504th
Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR)
1-504th PIR parachuted onto Torrijos Airport
several hours after H-Hour. At 0830, the battalion air assaulted into
Tinajitas, the location of the PDF's 1st Infantry Company. The battalion
received heavy ground fire from San Miguelito en route. On final approach to
the landing zone (LZ), the helicopters received constant fire from the
objective. The troopers received both direct and indirect fire as they
maneuvered up the hill to the objective. The battalion had a long hard fight
in taking Tinajitas due to the steep terrain and PDF defense. The objective
was secure by 1430 but the unit continued to receive sporadic sniper fire
from surrounding buildings. The battalion then conducted security sweeps on
21 Dec. On 22 Dec the battalion began stability operations. These continued
until 10 Jan when the battalion was relieved by elements of the 7th Infantry
Div (L) and redeployed from 10-12 Jan.
2d Battalion, 504th
Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR)
At 20 0200 Dec, 2-504th PIR parachuted onto
Torrijos Airport which was being secured by the 1-75th Ranger Regiment.
2-504th PIR air assaulted into Panama Viejo four hours later. Their mission
was to secure the PDF military complex at Panama Viejo, home of the 1st
Cavalry Squadron and the Panamanian Military Counter-Terrorist Unit (UESAT).
The PDF units had been alerted and resisted, but the battalion secured its
objectives by 1200.
While D-Day operations were still ongoing,
the 82d Airborne Div was ordered to secure the Marriott Hotel and rescue
civilians trapped there. B/2-504th PIR fought its way from Panama Viejo, and
secured the hotel. The next morning 29 American civilians were evacuated by
armed convoy to Panama Viejo and then flown to safety. Stability operations
in or near Panama City continued until 10 Jan when the battalion was
relieved by elements of the 7th Infantry Div (L) and redeployed from 10-12
Jan.
4th Battalion, 325th
Airborne Infantry Regiment (AIR)
4-325th AIR parachuted onto Torrijos Airport
early on 20 Dec. A Co then led the battalion's combat operations by air
assaulting into Ft. Cimmarron, location of the PDF's Battalion 2000. After
directing fire from an AC-130 against its objective, the company hit its LZ
at 1000 hrs. They met limited resistance and found 13 killed in action, 10
destroyed vehicles, and three 120-mm mortars. The company consolidated and
awaited linkup with the remainder of the battalion on 21 Dec.
On 22 Dec the battalion was given
responsibility for the security of the district containing the Papal
Nunciatura. Stability operations continued until 10 Jan when the battalion
was relieved by elements of the 7th Infantry Div (L) and redeployed from
10-12 Jan.
75TH RANGER REGIMENT (TASK
FORCE RED)
Task Force Red, the 75th Ranger Regiment, was given
two H-Hour missions. The first was to secure Tocumen PDF Airport/Torrijos
International Airport neutralizing the PDF's 2nd Infantry Co prior to the
82d Airborne Division's airborne assault 45 minutes later. The second
mission was to neutralize the PDF's 6th and 7th Infantry Companies at Rio Hato
west of Panama City.
1st Battalion (-) 75th
Ranger Regiment (TASK FORCE RED TANGO)
1-75th and C/3-75th Ranger Regiment became
Task Force
Red Tango. At 19 1800 Dec, Task Force Red Tango departed Hunter Army Airfield,
outside of Savannah, GA. Its mission was to seize Torrijos International
Airport and neutralize the PDF's 2d Infantry Co on Tocumen PDF Airport.
At 0100 an AC-130 opened fire on the compound
of the 2d Infantry Co as AAH-6 gunships fired on additional targets. Three
minutes later four Ranger companies parachuted from 500 feet onto the tarmac
of the airfield. The Rangers quickly eliminated PDF resistance and secured
their assault objectives. C/3-75th Ranger Regiment was to clear and seize
the main air terminal. The second and third floors were cleared, but the
first floor was isolated after it was discovered that the PDF took a number
of hostages. After two and one-half hours of negotiations, the hostages were
set free. By 0630 the airfield was secured, and a forward aerial resupply
point (FARP) was established to receive incoming aircraft.
On 28 Dec the battalion began
reconnaissance-in-force operations in the vicinity of Cerro Azul to pursue
remnants of the PDF and DIGBAT forces, seize reported weapons caches, and
neutralize potential rally points and exfiltration routes to the Panamanian
interior. The battalion redeployed on 3 Jan.
2d Battalion (-) and 3d
Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment (Task Force RED ROMEO)
Task Force Red Romeo departed Lawson Army Air Field,
FT Benning, GA at 19 1800 Dec. Its mission was to seize Rio Hato and
neutralize the 6th and 7th PDF Infantry Cos.
At 20 0100 Dec, the battalion jumped from
C-130s onto the airfield at Rio Hato. Both PDF companies had been alerted
and fired on the C-130s with small arms. Despite PDF resistance, the
battalion assembled, attacked the barracks and established an airhead. By
morning, the Rangers accomplished all missions, captured 250 prisoners and
cleared the airfield for future operations.
The battalions conducted security operations
until they redeployed on 9 and 10 Jan.
193D INFANTRY BRIGADE
(LIGHT) (TASK FORCE BAYONET)
The missions of the 193d Infantry Brigade (L)
were to isolate and clear the Commandancia, seize and secure the PDF
Engineer Battalion compound and portions of Ft. Amador, seize the Balboa and
Ancon DENI and Balboa Department of Transportation (DNTT) stations, protect
U.S. housing areas, and protect critical defense sites and areas. The
Brigade consisted of 1-508th Infantry(Airborne), 5-87th Infantry, and 4-6th
Infantry (M), who were attached from Operation NIMROD SUSTAIN.
4th Battalion, 6th Infantry
(Mech), 5th Infantry Division (M) (Attached to 193d Infantry Brigade (L))
(Task Force GATOR)
Task Force Gator was task-organized with the 4-6th
Infantry(-), 5th Infantry Div (M), that had been part of the Operation
NIMROD SUSTAIN augmentation and C/1-508th Infantry (Airborne). On D-Day, the
Task Force had the mission to conduct offensive operations to protect U.S. lives,
property, and vital Panama Canal facilities by isolating, seizing, and
securing the Commandancia complex and neutralizing PDF forces.
H-Hour was advanced 15 minutes, and Task
Force
crossed the line of departure (LD) at the new time, immediately receiving
enemy small arms fire. Although the Commandancia had received preparatory
fires from AC-130s and helicopter gunships, the initial fighting was heavy
and the battalion took losses in personnel and equipment. Despite the
resistance, the Task Force isolated the Commandancia by 0330.
Firing from the Commandancia and surrounding
buildings continued throughout the following day. Task Force Gator requested and
received a ranger company to clear the Commandancia Headquarters building
and C/1-508th Infantry (Airborne) had the mission to clear the remainder of
the complex. The final assault took place at 1600 and the objective was
secured by 1730.
The Task Force conducted security missions at the
Papal Nunciatura, Quarry Heights, Balboa Heights, Diablo Heights, and Ft.
Amador, which continued until the task force was relieved on 22 Jan by 3-6th
Infantry (M).
5th Battalion, 87th Infantry
(TASK FORCE WILDCAT)
Task Force Wildcat consisted of 5-87th Infantry and
the attached A/4-6th Infantry (M) from Ft. Polk, La. On D-Day the Task Force was to
neutralize the Balboa DENI, DNTT, the PDF Engineer compound, and emplace a
series of roadblocks to isolate the Commandancia. At H-Hour, the Task Force moved to
its objectives. It met stiff resistance from police and PDF soldiers at the
DENI and DNTT but secured its objectives by 0700.
On D+4 the Task Force conducted stability operations
and was involved in the security of the Santa Felipe, Santa Anna, El Marana,
and Chorillo sections of the city. During the remainder of the operation,
the Task Force secured key sites in Panama City and reacted to security and civil
military tasking.
1st Battalion, 508th
Infantry (Airborne) (TASK FORCE RED DEVIL)
The H-Hour mission of 1-508th Infantry
(Airborne)(-) was to air assault into Ft. Amador, neutralize the PDF 5th
Infantry Co, and protect the lives of American families in the U.S. housing
area.
Because H-Hour was advanced 15 minutes, Task
Force
Red Devil was ordered to seal off Ft. Amador prior to H-Hour. Two platoons
moved by truck to secure the main gate. As they arrived, two buses attempted
to escape; one was destroyed but the other ran the roadblock. At 0100, the
remainder of the battalion air assaulted into a hot LZ on Ft. Amador's golf
course and secured its assault objectives. By 0130, Task Force Red Devil had
surrounded the barracks and secured the American housing area. The PSYOP
team began broadcasting surrender terms but the PDF refused to comply. At
daylight, Task Force Red Devil assaulted the PDF barracks and secured them by 1645
without a single loss to the unit.
Throughout the remainder of the operation,
the Task Force conducted a variety of security and civil military operations.
Together with the 5-87th Infantry, Task Force Red Devil swept the Santa Felipe,
Santa Anna, El Marana, and Chorillo districts of the city.
3D BATTALION (+), 7TH
SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) (TASK FORCE BLACK)
3-7th SF reinforced by A/1-7th SF were
task-organized under Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) and were
in-country at the beginning of JUST CAUSE. On D-Day, units disabled the
television station at Cerro Azul and the two government radio stations and
stormed locations frequented by Noriega.
A critical mission, to seize the Pacora River
Bridge, was conducted by the A/3-7th SF at 20 0045 Dec. A large convoy,
reinforcing Torrijos/Tocumen Airport from PDF Battalion 2000, was halted and
destroyed attempting to cross the bridge.
After D-Day, Task Force Black's efforts shifted to
neutralizing outlying PDF garrisons and bringing the major military zone
headquarters in these rural areas under control of the new government. On 2
Jan, a reinforced Task Force Black was ordered to begin unilateral actions to
relieve conventional units from stability operations. The major objective
was liaison and training of the new FPP, reeducating them on how to support,
and protect the new government. This mission continued throughout the
transition to the nation building operation PROMOTE LIBERTY.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORP
The Marines supporting Operation Just Cause
were assigned to Marine Forces Panama, a combined force of 650 Marines under
the command of Col. Charles E. Richardson, that included:
* Company K, 3rd Battalion., 6th Marines
* Company D, 2nd LAI Battalion
* 1st Fleet Anti-Terrorist Security Force (FAST) Company
* Elements of Brigade Service Support Group 6
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By the fall of 1989, the
Noriega regime was barely clinging to power. Tensions increased when
election results were voided and opposition leaders were physically beaten
by Noriega's Dignity Battalions (DIGBATs). An unsuccessful PDF coup
attempt in October produced bloody reprisals. Deserted by all but a small
number of cronies, and distrustful of a shaken and demoralized PDF,
Noriega began increasingly to rely on irregular paramilitary units called
Dignity Battalions. In December 1989, the regime's paranoia made daily
existence unsafe for U.S. forces and other U.S. citizens.
Planning for the Panama
contingency began in February 1988, including a series of orders that
addressed the defense of the Old Canal Zone, noncombatant evacuation,
neutralization of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF), and Civil Military
Operations (CMO). The operation plan (PLAN) for offensive operations
became PLAN BLUE SPOON. In Sep 89, JTFSO revised PLAN BLUE SPOON. It was
changed from BLUE SPOON to PLAN 90-2. The October coup attempt caused PLAN
90-2 to be updated as the PDF displayed the capability to quickly
reinforce units in Panama City.
On 15 December 1989, the
National Assembly of Panama declared that a state of war existed with the
U.S. and adopted measures to confront foreign aggression. In the days that
followed, service members and dependents were harassed, and a Marine
lieutenant was killed.
On 17 December 1989 the
national command authority (NCA) directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
to execute PLAN 90-2. JTFSO received the JCS execute order on 18 Dec with
a D-Day and H-Hour of 20 Dec 0100 local. The operation was conducted as a
campaign with limited military objectives. JTFSO objectives in PLAN 90-2
were to: A.
Protect U.S. lives and key sites and facilities. B. Capture and deliver
Noriega to competent authority. C. Neutralize PDF forces. D. Neutralize
PDF command and control. E. Support establishment of a U.S.-recognized
government in Panama. F. Restructure the PDF.
At Forts Bragg, Benning,
and Stewart, D-Day forces were alerted, marshaled, and launched on a fleet
of 148 aircraft. Units from the 75th Ranger Regiment and 82d Airborne
Division conducted airborne assaults to strike key objectives at Rio Hato,
and Torrijos/Tocumen airports.
On December 20, 1989,
the 82d Airborne Division conducted their first combat jump since World
War II onto Torrijos International Airport, Panama. The 1st Brigade task
force made up of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 504th Parachute Infantry
Regiment, parachuted into combat for the first time since World War II. In
Panama, the paratroopers were joined on the ground by 3rd Battalion, 504th
Parachute Infantry Regiment which was already in Panama. After the night
combat jump and seizure of the airport, the 82nd conducted follow-on
combat air assault missions in Panama City and the surrounding areas.
They were followed later
by the 2d and 1st Bdes, 7th Inf Div (L), while the in-place forces
comprised of the 3d Bde (-), 7th Inf Div (L); 193d Infantry Brigade (L)
and 4-6 Inf, 5th Inf Div (M), assaulted objectives in both Panama City and
on the Atlantic side of the Canal. By the first day, all D-Day objectives
were secured. As initial forces moved to new objectives, follow-on forces
from 7th Inf Div (L) moved into the western areas of Panama and into
Panama City.
As the lead headquarters for SAC's tanker
support, the Eighth Air Force tasked, executed, and directed 144 missions
to refuel 229 receivers with over 12 million pounds of fuel. According to
General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Eighth’s
"air refuelers did not just make a difference in this operation -- they
made it possible." This mission introduced the F-117A Stealth Fighter to
combat for the first time.
Air National Guard units
participated in the operation because of their regularly scheduled
presence in Panama for Operations CORONET COVE and VOLANT OAK. Only
Pennsylvania's 193d Special Operations Group (SOG) was part of the
integral planning process by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Air Staff
for the invasion of Panama. The 105th Military Airlift Group (MAG) and the
172 MAG provided airlift support for the operation. They flew 35 missions,
completed 138 sorties, moved 1,911 passengers and 1,404.7 tons of cargo
which expended 434.6 flying hours. ANG VOLANT OAK C-130 aircrews flew 22
missions, completed 181 sorties, moved 3,107 passengers and 551.3 tons of
cargo, which expended 140.1 flying hours. The ANG CORONET COVE units, the
114th TFG and the 18Oth TFG flew 34 missions, completed 34 sorties,
expended 71.7 flying hours and expended 2,715 rounds of ordnance.
Urban terrain provides
high potential for fratricide because of the likelihood of close quarters
(high weapons density), recognition problems, and unfamiliar secondary
effects of weapons. During Operation JUST CAUSE soldiers employed several
ineffective and dangerous techniques to breach various fences, walls, and
barred doors with grenades, rifle fire, and even anti-tank weapons. Direct
fire support, even from just a block away, is very difficult to control.
During JUST CAUSE mechanized forces providing fire support were told by
brigade a light force had cleared a tall hotel building only to the second
floor. In actual fact, it had cleared to the tenth floor and was fighting
in a counter-sniper engagement. Seeing this fire and apparently some
weapons protruding, the mechanized forces began to suppress. This drew
return fire from the friendly light force for some seconds before coming
under control. The extensive destruction of civilian housing seen by TV
viewers around the world resulted rather from a style of fighting that is
based on abundant firepower.
The high casualties and
use of resources usually associated with all-out urban warfare did not
occur. The United States suffered 23 KIA and 324 WIA, with estimated enemy
casualties around 450. There were an estimated 200 to 300 Panamanian
civilian fatalities. Some were killed by the PDF, others inadvertently by
US troops. More civilians almost certainly would have been killed or
wounded had it not been for the discipline of the American forces and
their stringent rules of engagement (ROE). However, the United Nations
(UN) put the civilian death toll at 500; the Central American Human Rights
Defense Commission (CODEHUCA) and the Peace and Justice Service of Panama
both claimed between 2,000 to 3000; the Panamanian National Human Rights
Commission and an independent inquiry by former Attorney- General Ramsey
Clark claimed over 4,000. Thousands were injured. As it turned out, the
figure of Panamanian dead was large enough to stimulate debate over the
need for the invasion to remove Noriega, but not large enough to generate
a sense of outrage in Panama or abroad, or to turn the Panamanian people
against the US intervention or the nation-building program that followed
it.
The US troops involved in Operation Just Cause
achieved their primary objectives quickly, and troop withdrawal began on
December 27. Noreiga eventually surrendered to US authorities voluntarily.
He is now serving a 40-year sentence in Florida for drug trafficking.
Operation JUST CAUSE was
unique in the history of U.S. warfare for many reasons. As the largest
single contingency operation since World War II, it focused on a
combination of rapid deployment of critical combat power and precise
utilization of forward deployed and in-country forces. Impressed by the
smooth execution of JUST CAUSE, General Stiner later claimed that the
operation was relatively error free, confining the Air-and Battle doctrine
and validating the strategic direction of the military. He concluded,
therefore, that while old lessons were confirmed, there were "no [new]
lessons learned" during the campaign. Despite Stiner's assertions,
Operation JUST CAUSE offers important insights into the role of force in
the post Cold War period and the successful conduct of a peacetime
contingency operation.
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